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ARTICLE
THE STATION NIGHTCLUB FIRE AND
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL REACH:
THE MULTIDISTRICT, MULTIPARTY,
MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION
ACT OF 20021
PETER ADOMEIT2

INTRODUCTION

The fourth worst nightclub fire 3 in American history occurred
on February 20, 2003, in West Warwick, Rhode Island at The Sta
tion nightclub during a rock concert by the California-based heavy
metal band "Great White,"4 a few weeks after the effective dateS of
1. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002). It is part of the 21st
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act.
2. Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Professor
Adomeit teaches Civil Procedure and Labor Law. He is a member of the National
Academy of Arbitrators. He also has served as a Special Master in discovery matters in
Federal Court.
3. The others were Boston, Massachusetts, 1942-"the Coconut Grove fire"
(491 killed); Natchez, Mississippi, 1940 (198 killed); and Southgate, Kentucky, 1977 (175
killed). Elizabeth Mehren & Stephen Braun, Rhode Island Nightclub Fire Toll Nears
100; Band's Pryotechnics Ignite a Life-or-Death Rush for the Exits, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2003, at 1. For a history of nightclub fires in America, and how strict enforcement and
building codes have reduced the yearly number of nightclub fires from 1,369 in 1980 to
510 in 1998, see id. The worst single-building fire in American history killed 600 at the
Chicago Iroquois Theater in 1903 when the stage curtains ignited. This is the subject of
a book by Tony Hatch entitled TINDER Box. Sean D. Hamill, "Tinder Box" Author
Notes Tragic Parallel to Club Deaths, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2003, at 1. The Ringling Bros.
and Barnum & Bailey tent fire of 1944 in Hartford killed 168. Raja Mishra, Hartford
Group-Home Fire Kills 10, Dozens of Disabled, Aged Patients Led to Safety, 23 Hurt,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2003, at B-1.
4. Dave Wedge & Jessica Heslam, Station Pyro Passed Muster in Past, BOSTON
HERALD, Mar. 5, 2003, at 1; Michael Powell, R.l. Inspector Never Cited Foam; Club
Where 98 Died in Fire Used Flammable Soundproofing , WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2003, at
A-2.
5. The Act, which became effective on November 2, 2002, provides: "The amend
ments made by subsection (b) [adding 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1369,1697, and 1785, and amend
243

244

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:243

the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002.
As the band started its first number at 11:00 p.m. before a packed
audience, estimated at 380 people, their pyrotechnics ignited foam
sound insulation on the walls and ceiling. 6 The fire spread rapidly,
creating an inferno within three minutes.? The lights went out, and
in the panic, many could not escape. s One hundred people have
died,9 nearly one hundred ninety were injured, some twenty criti
cally.lO A WPRI cameraman, Brian Butlerl l recording what he
thought was going to be a concert, kept the camera rolling as he
backed out of the hall, catching the fire's start, its rapid spread, and
the victims' struggling to escape. The pictures were broadcast
widely, and the fire was national news.12 There is no way of over
stating the impact this tragedy has had on the people of a small
state like Rhode Island. 13
A disaster's effects ripple through a community, starting at the
core with the seriously injured and relatives of the deceased, and
moving in concentric circles through survivors who were exposed
to the disaster, to extended family members and rescue and re
ing 28 USCS §§ 1391 and 1441] shall apply to a civil action if the accident giving rise to
the cause of action occurred on or after the 90th day after the date of the enactment of
this Act." P.L. 107-273, § 11020(c), 116 Stat. 1829.
6. Powell, supra note 4.
7. News reports say smoke filled the building within twenty to thirty seconds, and
within three minutes, the whole interior was ablaze. Mehren & Braun, supra note 3.
8. An interview from the burn unit in a Rhode Island hospital, describes how the
floor collapsed as people piled up seven and eight deep, and how a "molten, tarlike
substance dripped on [a victim] from the ceiling of the burning nightclub as he struggled
to escape." Mary Duenwald, Tales From a Burn Unit: Agony, Friendship, Healing, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18,2003, at F-1 (illustrating two of the stories that a jury is likely to hear).
9. Associated Press, Nightclub Fire Death Toll Rises to 100, CNN.cOM, May 6,
2003, at http://www.cnn.coml2003IUSlNortheastl05/06/club.fire.ap/.
10. Dave Wedge, R.l. Fire's Death Toll Hits 99 as Officials Plan Fines in N.J.,
BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 7, 2003, at 2, 2003 WL 3018536. As of March 18, 2003, eleven
were reported to be still in critical condition, most on heavy sedation and breathing on
ventilators. Duenwald, supra note 8.
11. Lynne Duke, The Fire After; Two Brothers Fall into a Side Business-and
Their Own Public Hell, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2003, at C-l.
12. See, e.g., Michael S. Rosenwald & Jared Stearns, Deaths, Injuries in Fire at
R.I. Club, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2003, at A-I; Ariel Sabar, Two Minutes that Seemed
Like Forever; Great White Fan Relives Terrifying Moments Before Escape from R.I. In
ferno, BALT. SUN, Feb. 23, 2003, at I-A; Amy Forliti, 85 Die in Club Fire, DESERET
NEWS, Feb. 21, 2003, at A-I, 2003 WL 11722280; Fatal Fire Erupts at Nightclub Rock
Show, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2003, at 16, 2003 WL 13239939.
13. Some measure of the public response can be found in the outpouring of chari
table contributions and help and assistance to the victims. The Station Nightclub Disas
ter-Help, Memorial Services, Benefits, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 12, 2003, at A-14, 2003
WL 7058654.
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covery workers, to health-care providers and school personnel, to
government officials and affected businesses, to the community
at large. 14

The Rhode Island Judicial Department, having previous expe
rience with multiple cases involving asbestos claims and multiple
claims involving child abuse by clergy, has moved quickly to pre
pare for the expected litigation. The Rhode Island Judicial Depart
ment has assigned in advance all cases arising from the fire to a
respected judge, The Honorable Alice Gibney,15 who previously
handled several hundred asbestos cases. 16 Representative Timothy
Williamson of the Rhode Island Legislature introduced H. 6148,n
authorizing the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court to create spe
cial rules governing The Station fire cases. IS
In response to the first cases filed March 4, 2003,19 the Rhode
14. Felice J. Freyer, The Station Nightclub Disaster-Fire's Psychological Pain will
Test Survivors and Victims' Families for Years, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 19,2003, at
A-1. The article quotes Brian W. Flynn, Associate Director of the Center for the Stud
ies of Traumatic Stress, at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in
Bethesda, Md. "He said the West Warwick fire was unique because it struck the unusu
ally close-knit Rhode Island community, so its reverberations were felt widely." Litiga
tion does not end the pain. "Unlike a natural disaster, a human-caused event can cause
people to focus on fixing blame and seeking justice. Litigation, with its slow pace and
emphasis on how badly the victims' lives were damaged, often makes it hard for them to
move on." Litigation may solve financial problems, but not psychological ones. "Vic
tims often have an unrealistic notion of justice," Flynn said. "People believe lots of
times that if there is successful litigation, their problems will go away." People can win
their suit but "wake up the next day still having lost what they've lost," he said. Id.
15. Wedge, supra note 10. This article reports that Judge Gibney was assigned on
March 5, 2003, the day after the first case was filed.
16. Jonathan Saltzman, Purchase of Foam at Club is Traced, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 6, 2003, at B-5, 2003 WL 3383716.
17. The bill, introduced March 4, 2003, reads:
Section 1. The General Assembly finds that the interest of those who suffered
a loss because of death or injury as a result of the tragic fire at The Station in
West Warwick, Rhode Island on February 20, 2003 can best be served by a
fair, just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of their claims. Notwithstanding
any provisions of the law or Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure or Prac
tice to the contrary, all civil actions for damages as a result of this fire shall be
filed and heard pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Pre
siding Justice of the Superior Court. Provided, however that any rule promul
gated by the Presiding Justice of Superior Court that repeals or amends any
law shall require the approval of the General Assembly. Section 2. This act
shall take effect upon passage.
H. 6148 (R.I. 2003) (on file with author).
18. Liz Anderson, The Station Nightclub Disaster-Bill Would Simplify Fire Law
suits, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 12,2003, at A-12, 2003 WL 7058667. Representative
Williamson's district includes West Warwick.
19. Roderiques v. Town of West Warwick, No. PC 03-1084 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 4,
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Island Bar Association and the Rhode Island Lawyers Association
issued a joint statement discouraging a rush to litigate: "The news
that a local attorney has filed suits in this matter at this time is both
unfortunate and disconcerting. "20 David Curtin, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's disciplinary attorney, issued a public warning of
criminal prosecution for unauthorized practice of law to out-of
state lawyers who were allegedly offering their services to victims. 21
Judge Gibney also issued a statement, "This is not about speed, but
rather about thoroughness, fairness, efficiency and consistency in
administering steadfast justice for all of the parties involved."22
The judicial process will be working in a charged atmosphere
tinged with immeasurable grief, sorrow, suffering, and anger to
wards those deemed responsible, huge medical expenses for some,
and staggering economic damages. The claims could reportedly to
tal hundreds of millions of dollars?3
I.

ENTER THE MULTIDISTRICT, MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM
JURISDICTION

ACT

OF

200224

As the Rhode Island Judicial Department prepares to invest
substantial judicial resources to resolve these cases fairly and expe
ditiously, this new federal act may complicate their efforts. If the
Act is applied creatively, it could give helpful assistance toward
resolving these cases ... or it could cause delay.
The House Judiciary Committee Report,25 dated July 30, 1999,
shows the Act was in response to a 1998 decision by the United
States Supreme Court holding that when federal cases were trans
ferred to a single federal court for discovery under the Multidistrict
2003), naming fourteen defendants, was filed before the 40-day waiting period expired
under RI. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-5 (2002) for actions against municipalities. Kingsley v.
Derderian, No. 03-1171 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 10,2003), names eighteen defendants but
not the Town of West Warwick. The statute of limitations for wrongful death in Rhode
Island is three years. RI. GEN. LAWS, § 10-7-2. The statute of limitations is tolled for
minor plaintiffs until the age of majority, RI. GEN. LAWS, § 9-1-19, but not in wrongful
death cases. Short v. Flynn, 374 A.2d 787, 790 (1977).
20. Wedge, supra note 10.
21. Tracy Breton, The Station Nightclub Disaster-Unscrupulous Lawyers
Targeting Families, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Mar. 6, 2003, at A-I, 2003 WL 7057906.
22. Club Owner's Lawyer Reacts to Statements About Foam; Pine says Affidavit
Backs up Derderians, TURNTOlO.cOM, Mar. 6, 2003, at http://www.turntolO.com/news/
2024914/detail.html.
23. Ralph Ranalli & Christopher Rowland, Real Estate Group Backs Sprinkler
Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2003, at B-3, 2003 wL 3385142.
24. Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
25. H.R 106-276, 106th Congo (1999).
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Rules, the receiving court ,could not try the cases, but had to return
them for trial to the federal courts from which they were trans
ferred. 26 The Act reverses this decision, allowing the court receiv
ing Multidistrict cases to retain them for trial under certain
circumstances. It also went well beyond this immediate issue.
A.

Summary of the Act

The Act changes the laws of federal jurisdiction, removal juris
diction, venue, service of process, and subpoenas in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1369, 1391, 1441, 1697 and 1785. I liken the Act to a vacuum
cleaner: it can suck up all of the cases arising out of this horrific fire
regardless of where filed 27 and deposit them in federal court in
Rhode Island. 28 Once there, the federal court "shall abstain from
jurisdiction" if the dispute is primarily local,29 or the federal court
could keep the cases for determination of liability.30 If there is a
finding of liability, there is a right to immediate appeal;31 if liability
is upheld, the federal court then returns the cases "to the State
court from which it had been removed"32 for a determination of
damages, but is given discretion to retain the damage issues as
well.33
B.

The Act Only Requires Minimal Diversity

The Act creates original jurisdiction in federal court for "any
civil action" involving "minimal diversity"34 for claims for deaths
26. Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 V.S. 26 (1998) (in
terpreting 28 V.S.c. § 1407(a), and holding that 28 v.s.c. § 1404(a) did not give au
thority to the discovery court to transfer the cases to itself, despite a history of self
assignment).
27. 28 v.s.c. §§ 1369-1441(d) (2002). Any victim of the accident can intervene,
even those who could not file originally in federal court, according to § 1369(d).
28. Section 1369(e) calls for notice to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga
tion. Because the accident occurred in Rhode Island and many of the victims reside
there, the proper court to receive the cases would appear to be the Rhode Island Fed
eral District Court. Venue under § 1391(g) in § 1369 cases is where "any defendant
resides" or where "a substantial part of the accident giving rise to the actions took
place."
29. § 1369(b).
30. § 1441(e)(2).
31. § 1441(e)(3).
32. § 1441(e)(2).
33. Id.
34. "[M]inimal diversity exists between adverse parties if any party is a citizen of
a State and any adverse party is a citizen of another State, a citizen or subject of a
foreign State, or a foreign State as defined in section 1603(a) of this title." § 1369(c)(1).
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and injuries and property damage "arising from a single accident"35
causing at least seventy-five deaths if certain, easily met conditions
are present. 36 Therefore, the statute applies to The Station night
club tragedy. The fire was caused by an accident,3? it resulted in
more than seventy-five deaths, there are at least two adverse parties
from different states: victims resided in states other than Rhode Is
land, and any two defendants are from different states (for example
the band members of "Great White" were reportedly residents of
California, while the owners of The Station reside in Rhode Island).
The concept of "minimal diversity" comes from the Federal In
terpleader Act,38 which requires diversity of citizenship between
any two claimants, regardless of whether additional claimants are
from the same state. The Supreme Court has concluded that all the
Constitution requires is minimal diversity and not complete
diversity.39

C.

The Act Covers Claims for Wrongful Death, Injuries and
Property Damage

The statute contains a threshold of at least seventy-five deaths,
but once that is reached, the statute creates jurisdiction over "any
civil action . . . between adverse parties that arises from a single
accident." The term "any civil action" is all-inclusive. It is not
limited to wrongful death actions. It contains an added limitation
that an action for property damage may be maintained "only if
[there is] physical harm" to a "natural person."40 These words
seem confusing. Here is why.
The Act as originally proposed applied where twenty-five per
sons "either died or incurred injury" in the accident, and it also
35. § 1369(a).
36. § 1369(a) requires:
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident took
place in another State or other location, regardless of whether that defendant
is also a resident of the State where a substantial part of the accident took
place; (2) any two defendants reside in different States regardless of whether
such defendants are also residents of the same State or States; or "(3) substan
tial parts of the accident took place in different States.
37. The Act defines an accident as "a sudden accident, or a natural event culmi
nating in an accident, that results in death incurred at a discrete location by at least 75
natural persons." 28 U.s.c. § 1369(c)(4) (2002).
38. § 1335.
39. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
40. § 1369(c)(3).
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contained a $75,000 amount in controversy41 requirement. It was
necessary, therefore, to define injury. When the statute finally
passed, the number was raised to seventy-five, the reference to "or
incurred injury" was dropped, and the $75,000 amount in contro
versy provision was dropped. The definition of "injury" remained,
however, in § 1369(c)(3). However, there was nothing to attach the
definition to. This much is clear. If Congress intended by this to
limit the lawsuits to wrongful death only, and not include injuries to
persons or property, they expertly concealed that intent by includ
ing a definition of injuries to persons or property. Nor is there any
thing in the operative language that limits the Act to death cases
only. Finally, the damages for injuries could well exceed those for
wrongful death, and if the statute is to have any effect on mass
torts, all claims must be included, not just some of them. A reme
dial statute should be given a construction that brings about, rather
than nullifies, the intended result. The words "any civil action"
mentioned above supports the argument. Thus, the Act appears to
cover all cases arising out of The Station nightclub fire.
D.

The Act Contains No Minimum Amount in Controversy

The Act contains no amount in controversy requirement. As
suming minimal diversity, any tragedy that takes seventy-five lives
will be of sufficient moment to warrant the attention of the federal
courts. This also means that smaller claims (for example, damage
to a car in the parking lot of The Station nightclub, damage well
under the $75,000 requirement of the general diversity statute)42
could be filed in or removed to Federal Court under the Act. 43
There is not even a $500 threshold such as exists in the Federal
Interpleader Act.44 The intent is to consolidate all claims from the
accident-literally all claims-in federal court. In this way, the
sweep of the vacuum cleaner is complete.
41. § 1369(a) (proposed in 1999 Committee Reports amended and enacted in
H.R. 2215, 107th Congo (2002), H.R. 106-276 (July 30, 1999)).
42. Section 1332(a) requires a claim in excess of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.
43. The only limitation is contained in the definition of "injury," which is either
"(A) physical harm to a natural person and (B) physical damage to or destruction of
tangible property, but only if physical harm described in subparagraph (A) exists." 28
U.s.c. § 1369(c) (2002). The statute obviously does not require that the person injured
be the same person who lost property.
44. § 1335(a).
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E.

The Act Provides for Nationwide Service of Process and of
Subpoenas
The Act45 provides for nation-wide service of process and na
tion-wide subpoena of witnesses. 46 In this, the Act is similar to the
Federal Interpleader Act. 47 On a practical level, this means that
federal courts are not dependent upon the vagaries of state long
arm statutes to determine whether federal courts have jurisdiction
over the person.

F.

The Act Allows Any Person with a Claim to Intervene

The Act provides that "any person with a claim arising from
the accident ... shall be permitted to intervene."48 The right to
intervene exists even if the person could not have brought an origi
nal action under the Act. 49 This makes clear the sweeping nature of
the Act. Once federal jurisdiction attaches, all claims may be adju
dicated at the same time without restrictions, so long as plaintiffs
are willing to intervene and defendants are willing to remove or the
first plaintiffs are willing to file in federal court.
G.

The Act Provides for Broad Removal Jurisdiction in Federal
Court

We have seen that § 1369 creates original jurisdiction in federal
court involving the deaths of "at least 75 natural persons"50 at a
"discrete location" resulting from an "accident" with "minimal di
versity between adverse parties." Under § 1369(d), a plaintiff has a
right to intervene "even if" unable to sue under § 1369 "as an origi
nal matter." To this the statute adds a broad removal provision.
45. Section 1697 provides: "When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in
whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, process, other than subpoenas, may be
served at any place within the United States, or anywhere outside the United States if
otherwise permitted by law."
46. Section 1785 provides:
When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in whole or in part upon
section 1369 of this title, a subpoena for attendance at a hearing or trial may, if
authorized by the court upon motion for good cause shown, and upon such
terms and conditions as the court may impose, be served at any place within
the United States, or anywhere outside the United States if otherwise permit
ted by law.
47. Service of process under § 1335(a) may be against "all claimants" and no geo
graphical limit is provided. 28 U.S.c. § 2361 (2002).
48. § 1369(d).
49. Section 1369(d) reads, "even if that person [the intervenor] could not have
brought an action in a district court as an original matter."
50. § 1369(a).
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Section 1441(d) creates additional removal jurisdiction by bringing
in cases that "could have been brought" under § 1369 and by nulli
fying the restrictions on removal in mass tort cases. Specifically, the
in-state defendant, previously unable in ordinary diversity cases to
remove,51 is specifically permitted to remove a mass disaster case to
federal court.52 If the defendant "is a party to an action which is or
could have been brought" under § 1369, it is removable. 53 If the
action involves the "same accident as the action in State court" it is
removable, even if the action "could not have been brought in dis
trict court as an original matter. "54
Once the action is removed, it can either remain with that fed
eral court, be transferred to another federal court under the Mul
tidistrict Litigation Act,55 or be dismissed for inconvenient forum.56
For example, a state court action arising out of The Station night
club disaster filed in California against the band Great White could
be removed from state to federal court and transferred to federal
court in Rhode Island, or it could be dismissed in California and re
filed in Rhode Island.
H.

The Act Provides for Liberal Venue Rules

The Act amended § 1391 of the U.S. Code to provide that an
action "based upon Section 1369" can be brought where "any de
fendant resides" or where "a substantial part of the accident giving
rise to the action took place."57 Venue would be proper in Rhode
Island, where the accident happened. However, the federal court
retains the power "to transfer or dismiss an action on the ground of
51. § 1441(b).
52. The operative language is:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a defendant in
a civil action in a State court may remove the action to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where the ac
tion is pending (A) the action could have been brought in a United States
district court under section 1369 of this title; or (B) the defendant is a party to
an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or in part, under
section 1369 in a United States district court and arises from the same accident
as the action in State court, even if the action to be removed could not have
been brought in a district court as an original matter.
28 u.s.c. § 1441(e)(1) (2002).
53. § 1441(e)(1)(A).
54. § 1441(e)(1)(B).
55. 42 u.s.c. § 14070).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(2).
57. § 1391(g).
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inconvenient forum."58 As stated earlier, this would mean that an
action filed in California, Massachusetts-or Connecticut or any
other place where a defendant could be found-could either be
transferred to Rhode Island, or dismissed and re-filed in Rhode
Island.

II.

CAVEAT-THE FEDERAL COURT MAY ABSTAIN FROM
ACCEPTING JURISDICTION

A.

The Act States the Federal Court Shall Abstain from
Accepting Jurisdiction in Primarily Local Actions
If a "substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of" Rhode

Island, if the "primary defendants are also citizens of" Rhode Is
land, and if the claims are governed primarily by Rhode Island law,
then the federal court must abstain. 59 The Act states, under the
language "Limitation of Jurisdiction," that the court "shall abstain"
from hearing an "action described in subsection [1369] (a)" if two
conditions are met: "(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are
citizens of a single State of which the primary defendants are also
citizens; and (2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by
the laws of that State."60 This is a critical provision of the Act.
How does it apply to The Station fire?
The first condition has two parts: first, that a "substantial ma
jority of the plaintiffs" be from "a single state." The published lists
of dead and injured are not complete, final, or officia1. 61 The Act
does not require that those who are deceased be "from a single
state," only that the "substantial majority of the plaintiffs" be citi
zens of a single state. It is possible, but by no means certain, that a
court could conclude that Rhode Island victims predominate. The
published list of known victims (there may be those who suffered
slight injuries or property damage who are not listed in the pa
pers62) show scores of addresses from Massachusetts, many from

58. § 1441(e)(6).
59. § 1369(b)(1).
60. § 1369(b).
61. The Station Nightclub Disaster-List of the Victims, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL.,
Mar. 7, 2003, at A-12, 2003 WL 7058346.
62. The American Lung Association of Rhode Island has launched a public cam
paign to identify concert patrons who breathed toxic fumes, but who may not have
sought medical treatment. According to Margaret Kane, Executive Director of the As
sociation, "Some of these conditions don't manifest themselves for weeks or months
later .... That's why it's important to follow these people." Tom Mooney, Lung Asso
ciation to Screen Fire Victims, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Apr. 17,2003.
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Connecticut, and a few from other states. Rhode Island addresses
appear to be in the bare majority.63 Whether they are a "substan
tial majority" will require closer factual inquiry.
Second, the first condition requires that the "primary defend
ants" be from the same state as the substantial majority of plaintiffs.
The only state to which that could apply is Rhode Island.
Must all of the primary defendants be from Rhode Island, or
only some of them? The Act doesn't say. It says "primary defend
ants."64 Are the primary defendants the owners of the nightclub,
the Town of West Warwick, the building inspectors, the foam sup
plier, the local radio station, and the local beer distributor? Does it
include the band Great White? Are the parties who created the
condition under which the building could burn so rapidly primary
defendants? Or is the party who lit the spark? Or are both?
The issue is more than how to classify certain defendants, but
how to use the Act. True, an argument could be made that the
primary defendants do not include insurance companies, Clear
Channel Communications, Inc., the owner of the local radio station,
or Anheuser-Busch, because their alleged liabilities are derived
from their relationships to the primary defendants: the Town of
West Warwick, the local beer distributor, and the local radio sta
tion. However, it would be difficult to argue that the California
band Great White-whose fee for this performance was reported to
be $2,50065-is not among the primary defendants. They started
the fire. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the primary de
fendants are all from Rhode Island.
Perhaps this is the wrong question. In making a determination
of who is primary and thus who is secondary, the court should be
guided by the ultimate question: which system, state or federal, can
best produce a fair and expeditious result of all of the expected
litigation, and how best should the Act be implemented? If the an
swer is federal, then there are arguably enough non-Rhode Island
primary defendants here to justify a decision to keep the cases in
federal court and not to abstain. Abstention, after all, requires
looking not only at the victims, but also at the defendants. Even if a
substantial majority of victims are from Rhode Island-a conclu
63. According to the published list of victims, fifty-eight of the one hundred fatal
ities were Rhode Island residents. The Station Nightclub Disaster-List of the Victims,
supra note 61.
64. 28 U.S.c. § 1369(b) (2002).
65. Wedge & Heslam, supra note 4.
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sion that appears unlikely if the victim lists are accurate-not all
the primary defendants appear to be from Rhode Island.
Turning to the second condition, whether the claims "will be
governed primarily by the laws of"66 Rhode Island, without know
ing the legal theories of cases yet to be filed, it is difficult to predict
whether the cases will be "governed primarily by" state law. How
ever, two state lawsuits filed multiple causes of action under Rhode
Island law only.67 Should that pattern hold, then the second condi
tion that the claims be "governed primarily" by state law would be
met. But because the two conditions both must be met, if the "pri
mary defendants" include the California band Great White,
Anheuser-Busch, American Foam Company, or Clear Channel
Communications, it is likely that the federal court would not ab
stain. A third lawsuit was filed under § 1360 in federal court on
behalf of three Rhode Island plaintiffs. 68 This suit names several
out-of-state plaintiffs and the State of Rhode Island, in addition to
many of those plaintiffs named in the Kingsley and Roderiques
state lawsuits.
B.

When Is the Decision to Abstain to Be Made?

When does the federal court make the decision to abstain?
The statute, as noted above, does not require for abstention a
counting of victims, only a counting of "plaintiffs." When is the
count to be made? It is conceivable that additional cases may not be
filed for a substantial period of time. Is the court supposed to antic
ipate that more cases will be filed in making a decision to abstain?
Or must the court count only the existing plaintiffs? If it is the lat
ter, then all of the existing plaintiffs in the two cases filed to date
are from Rhode Island. That would create a skewed interpretation
of the Act.
Congress did not provide a time limit. for a court to decline
jurisdiction. For the Act to work, the court must be given leeway to
66. § 1369(b).
67. Kingsley v. Derderian, No. 03-1171 (RI. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2003), states
claims against The Station's owners, the installers of the soundproofing, the managers
of the pyrotechnics, the members of the band Great White, a beer company, a radio
station alleged to have sponsored the event, and the manufacturer of the foam. All the
claims are based on Rhode Island law. Roderiques v. Town of West Warwick, No. PC
03-1084 (R!. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2003), names fourteen defendants, many of which are
named in Kingsley, and joins the Town of Warwick and the fire inspector. All of the
claims arise under Rhode Island law. Neither action states federal claims for relief.
68. Passa v. Derderian, No. 03-148L (D.RI. filed Apr. 22, 2003). This case is
before Judge Ronald R. Lejueux.
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wait for additional filings before making the determination. But if
the court waits on the other plaintiffs to file, then the cases might sit
in limbo in federal court while the court awaits word as to which of
the other plaintiffs intend to file an action. Given the Hobson's
Choice of prematurely declining jurisdiction on the one hand, and
sitting on the filed or removed cases to see what will develop on the
other, the better solution may be for the court to make an educated
guess that those killed or injured will become plaintiffs, and the
court would then count these potential plaintiffs along with those
who have filed to determine who is a "plaintiff" for purposes of
deciding whether to abstain.
However, that solution has pitfalls, too. The victim lists are
unofficial, and include the dead and hospitalized, but not all those
who were injured. And it omits property claims altogether. It is
impossible from looking at the published lists to determine whether
Rhode Island victims, who appear on first reading to be in the ma
jority, would be a "substantial majority" as required by the Act. If
the burden were to be placed on the parties seeking abstention,
they may have a difficult burden. Perhaps that is the best a federal
court could do if a case is removed-deny abstention on the
grounds that the burden of proof rests with the party seeking ab
stention, and proceed to take control of the pace of litigation until
such time as the residences of the victims become more clear. Or,
alternatively, the federal court, if asked to do so, could take control
of the litigation before it, finish all discovery, and then look at the
abstention question. Then, if the rules require abstention, the fed
eral court would remand to the Rhode Island courts.
The removal provisions may offer some solution to the absten
tion issue. The removal provisions of the Act69 require a defendant
to remove "within 30 days" after becoming a "party." However,
the Act also allows removal "at a later time with leave of the dis
trict court." This could be interpreted (perhaps) as allowing the
federal court to postpone the decision on whether to abstain from
hearing the cases until a clearer picture emerges of whether a sub
69. 42 U.S.C. §1441(e)(1) (2002) provides:
The removal of an action under this subsection shall be made in accordance
with section 1446 of this title, except that a notice of removal may also be filed
before trial of the action in State court within 30 days after the date on which
the defendant first becomes a party to an action under section 1369 in a
United States district court that arises from the same accident as the action in
State court, or at a later time with leave of the district court.
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stantial majority of the plaintiffs and the primary defendants are
from Rhode Island.
Ultimately, non-residents of Rhode Island have a right to liti
gate in federal court, if not under the Act then under general diver
sity jurisdiction. Non-residents of Rhode Island also have a right to
remove to federal court, if not under the Act then under the re
moval statutes generally. A single Connecticut plaintiff can sue
under diversity in Rhode Island federal court so long as no defend
ants in that action are from Connecticut. Obviously, the Act cannot
be construed as denying to plaintiffs the right to sue under general
diversity or denying to qualified defendants the right to remove
under the general removal statutes. The power to abstain from
hearing cases under § 1369 does not extend to a requirement that
the federal court abstain from hearing cases filed under the general
diversity or federal question provisions. Given that reality, it may
be inevitable that The Station fire cases will end up in federal court.
Even if the court were to abstain under § 1369, it cannot abstain
under general diversity jurisdiction in § 1331.

III.

THE BIG PIcrURE: THE PRAcrICAL IMPAcr OF
ApPLICATION OF THE Acr

A.

The Act Exists to Simplify Litigation Which Otherwise May
Be in Multiple Courts

We cannot lose sight of the big picture. This Act exists to fulfill
a need that the previous jurisdictional statutes could not fill. Just as
the Federal Interpleader Act was created in response 70 to an state
interpleader system that could not reach out-of-state claimants and
thus forced an insurance company to pay the same debt twice,71 the
Multidistrict, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act was in response to
the impossibility of trying complex cases in an expeditious manner
before a single court. There are two ways the federal courts can
assist the Rhode Island judicial system, should they be asked to do
so.
First, the Federal Interpleader Act permits a federal court,
should a defendant petition it, to enjoin disbursements and collec
tion of judgments in any other court, even before the judgments are
entered. Under State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v Tashire,72 the fed
eral courts are permitted under the Federal Interpleader Act to su
70. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 194 (1934).
71. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
72. 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
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pervise the ultimate disbursements of funds which may be owed by
tort defendants to plaintiffs before plaintiffs have reduced their
claims to judgment. This prevents the first plaintiffs from settling
or going to trial, and taking the lion's share of a defendant's assets,
leaving little or nothing for the other victims.
Second, federal courts may consider dismissing without
prejudice, rather than transferring to Rhode Island federal court,73
cases filed in other states (should there be any). If actions are com
menced in states other than Rhode Island, in state or federal court,
the Multiforum, Multidistrict Trial Jurisdiction Act allows the fed
eral court to "transfer" or dismiss for inconvenient forum.1 4 Typi
cally a· court will accept the case and transfer to the convenient
forum, which would undoubtedly be Rhode Island.15 But there are
important, critical consequences of whether the federal court in a
non-Rhode Island state dismisses the action, causing the plaintiff to
file a new action in Rhode Island (assuming the statute of limita
tions has not run) or if the federal court transfers the case to Rhode
Island.
Here is the key concern. It is possible that, after assuming ju
risdiction over a mass disaster case, and after having all the cases
consolidated in a single court to determine liability, the federal
court may be required by the Act to return the cases to state courts
in which they were filed for trials on the issues of damages, unless
convenience and justice requires otherwise.16 The exception may
swallow the rule-which state court? Here is the answer under the
73. 28 U.S.c. §§ 1404(a) & 1441(e)(6).
74. "Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the authority of the district court to
transfer or dismiss an action on the ground of inconvenient forum." § 1441(e)(6).
75. For example, in an action filed in New York federal court involving the negli
gent delivery of gasoline causing a warehouse fire in Virginia, the Court ruled that the
action should not be tried in New York, but rather in Virginia, where the witnesses
resided and the fire occurred. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502-03, 512
(1946). The decision upheld the trial court's dismissal for forum non conveniens.
76. 28 U.S.c. § 1441(e)(2) provides:
(2) Whenever an action is removed under this subsection and the district court
to which it is removed or transferred under section 14070) has made a liability
determination requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district court
shall remand the action to the State court from which it had been removed for
the determination of damages, unless the court finds that, for the convenience
of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should be
retained for the determination of damages.
The reference to "section 14070)" is a drafting error; the 1999 version of the Act con
tained a section 1407(j). See H.R. Rep. No. 106-276, at 2 (1999). The transfer language
of Act went to another section, by cross reference to "Section 1407" in § 1441(e)(5), but
the cross reference to "1407(j)" is to a nonexistent section, and it was not corrected.
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Act: "The district court shall remand the action to the State court
from which it had been removed for the determination of dam
ages."77 So, if actions are brought in Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and California, and removed under § 1441 and transferred to
Rhode Island federal court for trial, the federal court is directed by
the Act to return the cases to the courts from which they were re
moved for purposes of trial on the issues of damages, again with
proviso that the federal court can retain the cases for triaL
This result would disperse all the damage trials for cases not
filed in Rhode Island among the sending courts. Instead of having
Judge Alice Gibney in charge of all the damage cases, with the abil
ity to bring about a global settlement, the cases would be spread,
some in Rhode Island, some in Connecticut, others in Massachu
setts, or California. Thus, more delay in reimbursing the victims for
their damages would occur.
Consequently, federal courts not in Rhode Island may assist in
the settlement or trial of these cases (assuming a finding of inconve
nient forum) by dismissing without prejudice any action filed in any
states other than the place of the tragedy, rather than by transfer
ring the cases to Rhode Island. The dismissed cases would then be
re-filed in Rhode Island. That simple difference would result in all
damage claims being tried in Rhode Island courts, either state or
federal, and might decrease delay and increase the chances of
settlement.
B.

If the Federal Court Were to Retain the Case, and Find
Liability, the Act Creates a Presumption that the Cases
Will Be Remanded to State Court for Finding of
Damages

Under § 1441(e)(2), if the federal court retains the case, and
makes "a liability determination requiring further proceedings as to
damage" the court "shall remand" to the state, unless it finds that
"for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of
justice, the action should be retained for determination of dam
ages." The standard is a broad one and leaves considerable room
for judicial discretion. If all litigants in The Station fire cases stay
out of federal court, the matter is moot. If litigants decide to use
the federal court, and if the federal court does not decline jurisdic
tion, how the litigation will look after a determination of liability is
hard to predict. What can be said at this stage is the language of
77.

§ 1441(e)(2).
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§ 1441(e)(2) creates a presumption that the cases will be returned

to state court. By severing liability from damages, however, the Act
may alter the traditional function of judge and jury. Usually, de
fendants prefer trials on issues of liability only, and plaintiffs prefer
both issues to be tried together. As a practical matter, the settle
ment value of a case depends upon both the strength of the evi
dence on liability and on damages. However, once liability is
established, the cases may settle more quickly without having to use
any evidence relating to damages.
C.

The Federal Court's Decision on which Court Tries the Issues
of Damages is Non-Appealable

Regardless of how the federal court rules on whether to re
mand to state court for trial on the issues of damages, the Act states
the remand decision is not subject to appellate review. "Any deci
sion," reads the Act, "under this subsection concerning remand for
the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise."78 In effect, therefore, the federal trial judge will have
the first, last, and only word on whether to try damages in federal
court or remand the damages to state court. The reason should be
apparent. If the federal court retains a case and tries it on issues of
liability and then holds a second trial on damages, the parties have
had their day in court. The same is true if the federal court returns
the cases to the respective state courts.
D.

The Act Allows an Immediate Appeal of a Finding of
Liability Before Trial on the Issue of Damages

Under the Act, if a federal court finds no liability, judgment
would be entered accordingly and be subject to appeal in the ordi
nary course. If a federal court finds liability, then the Act allows an
immediate appeal before a trial on the issue of damages. 79 The Act
allows only one appeal on the issue of liability.8o
By creating an appeal between the liability and damages por
78. § 1441( e)( 4) (2003).
79. Section 1441(e)(3) provides:
An appeal with respect to the liability determination of the district court may
be taken during that 60-day period to the court of appeals with appellate juris
diction over the district court. In the event a party files such an appeal, the
remand shall not be effective until the appeal has been finally disposed of.
Once the remand has become effective, the liability determination shall not be
subject to further review by appeal or otherwise.
80. 28 U.S.c. § 1441(e)(3).
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tion of the case, the statute creates a potential for delay. Settling a
case on appeal may be easier if there is a jury verdict on damages,
because each side can estimate their risk of loss in real dollars.
However, if a defendant loses on the liability question, an appeal
would not be unexpected. The Act permits this appeal sooner
rather than later, but not twice. Both judicial systems, state and
federal, have a stake in handling these cases in an expeditious man
ner. As experienced lawyers know, most cases settle, and perhaps
the best force for settlement is the trial judge's words, "Call your
first witness." The Act has the potential to hasten that day, and
thus hasten the settlement of many of the anticipated cases.
E.

What if All Plaintiffs and All Defendants in an Action Wish
to Remain in Rhode Island State Court?

There are two roads to federal court: 1) original jurisdiction
under § 1369 (or § 1331) and 2) removal jurisdiction under § 144l.
If, for example twenty-five plaintiffs sue in state court, and all the
defendants in that case are satisfied with that forum, and take no
steps to remove, the twenty-five cases remain in state court. There
is nothing automatic about these rules; they are not self-executing.
If both sides in an action arising out of The Station fire wish to
remain in state court, they will. The Act allows plaintiffs to force
unwilling defendants into federal court; the Act allows defendants
to force unwilling plaintiffs into federal court. But if both sides to
an action, plaintiffs and defendants choose state court, who can ob
ject? There appears to be no mechanism under the Act. Essen
tially, the Act does not give to federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over mass torts; it gives concurrent jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

This article is highly tentative and meant to generate a
thoughtful approach to the Act. The impulse for the article is to
help the judicial process, in the face of this tragedy, to bring the
cases to a just conclusion.
Without the Act, most cases would be in state court, while a
few might be in federal court. There would be little uncertainty as
to which court would hear the cases. Before the Act went into ef
fect on February 2, 2003, in-state defendants in a mass tort could
not remove, and Rhode Island plaintiffs could not sue Rhode Island
defendants under the general diversity statute.
With the Act, once any plaintiff or any defendant invokes it,
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then federal jurisdiction may well be inevitable. The likelihood that
the Act applies is substantial, and even if a court were to abstain
under the Act, which does not appear likely, the Act does not nul
lify the existing rights of plaintiffs, if they so choose, (assuming
complete diversity) to litigate in federal court. Litigation in federal
court without the Act increases the risk of increased cost and delay.
Therefore, litigation with the Act is a preferable outcome. The
choice may not be federal court under the Act versus state court.
The choice may well be federal court under the Act versus federal
court under general diversity statutes. However, if no party
chooses to litigate in federal court, the cases will remain in state
court.
The Rhode Island judiciary is preparing, as it must, for an on
slaught of cases, without knowing in which court-state or fed
eral-the cases may ultimately be heard. The Station fire cases will
be litigated in a sea of uncertainty and sadness. Will defendants
remove? Will plaintiffs choose federal court? Will plaintiffs sue
outside of Rhode Island? Will the federal courts abstain? Are the
Rhode Island victims a "substantial majority"? Are victims "plain
tiffs" before they sue? Who are the "primary defendants"? Will a
federal court try the issues of liability, and if so, damages as well?
The Act has great potential for expediting The Station fire
cases. The object of the Act is to place all of the cases from a mass
disaster before a single judge, who can supervise discovery, then try
the issue of liability, and either try or remand the issue of damages.
How this new procedural tool will function is uncertain. The Act
consolidates the power in one court to either urge the parties to
accept a global settlement, or send the unresolved cases to trial.
There are many unanswered questions. It is up to judges and law
yers to make the statute work within the structures of the American
system of litigation. Whether the trial judge will be a federal judge
in Rhode Island or Judge Gibney or both remains to be seen. Let's
hope the system will create some alternative procedures to bring
these cases to a satisfactory solution.

